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MOTILITY, AGGRESSION, AND THE BODILY I:
AN INTERPRETATION OF WINNICOTT
[Published in Psychoanalytic Quarterly,
October, 2015, Volume LXXXIV, Number 4, pp. 943-973]

By Jeremy Elkins
Associate Professor at Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania.

Among the central ideas associated with the name of Winnicott, scant mention is made of motility.
This is largely attributable to Winnicott himself, who never thematized motility and never wrote
a paper specifically devoted to the topic. This paper suggests both that the idea of motility is
nonetheless of central significance in Winnicott’s thought, and that motility is of central
importance in the development and constitution of the bodily I. In elaborating both these
suggestions, the paper gives particular attention to the connections between motility, continuity,
aggression, and creativity in Winnicott’s work.

INTRODUCTION
“The I,” Freud (1923) famously taught us, “is first and foremost a bodily I” (or bodily
ego, in Strachey’s translation; p. 26). In his own elaboration of this idea, Freud tended to focus
on the bodily origin of the I in terms of sensations: “The ego [Ich] is ultimately derived from
bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the surface of the body” (p. 26n). In contrast,
Freud tended to treat bodily movement not as constitutive of the ego, but as one of its functions.
It is among the “principal characteristics of the ego” (1938, p. 145), he wrote, that it “has
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voluntary movement at its command” so that it “controls the approaches to motility.” (1933, p.
75).
Two beliefs underlie the present paper. The first is of the indispensability of Freud’s
general insight: to understand the I, it is essential to understand its bodily origins. The second
belief is of the necessity to go beyond an understanding of this insight in terms of sensation, and
to comprehend as well under the general statement the central role of movement in the
development of the I; that is, to see movement not only as a function of the developed I, but as
(partly) constitutive of its origin.
Attending to the constitutive role of movement---or, more specifically, as the term will be
used here, of motility---has fundamental implications for our understanding not only of the
origins of the I, but also of its processes; that is, (in different language) for our understanding of
(certain kinds of) ego processes. While our ordinary tendency is to understand the ego as a kind
of container (or, when understood in its agential sense, as a custodian of the container)---in
relation to which we can talk, for example, about processes such as introjection and projection--the central pursuit of this paper is the idea that the self or ego needs also to be comprehended as
movement. (In focusing here just on the significance of motility to the ego, I shall naturally be
leaving aside a great deal that is also central to ego development, including the role of perception,
affects, drives and erotogenic zones, and object relations.)
I have mentioned the term motility, and I need to say now how I shall be using it.
Although motility is sometimes used to refer to the autonomic movement of particular organs
(such as, notably, peristalsis), I shall use it here (as it is commonly used, including by Freud
[Motilität], e.g., 1923, 1933, 1938) in a more restricted sense. The specific sense in which I shall
use the term can be stated briefly as follows.
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At the beginning of life, even of a life that is not yet that of a person, and even of a life
that will never be that of a person, there is movement. And very early on, perhaps marking the
very emergence of life as an organized entity, there is a kind of movement that we as observers
will commonly regard as not merely the movement of this or that component system within the
organism, but of the organism itself. (It does not matter for our purposes whether this arrives at
one moment or in phases over time.) This is the kind of movement that we think of as the
movement of an individual being---the kind of movement that, in the case of a person, when it
ends, we commonly regard the life of the person as having ended (there are exceptions). It is this
kind of movement that is comprehended in what I shall refer to as motility. I add the following
paragraph, though this gets further into the substance of the paper and cannot be decided as a
matter of terminological usage.
At some point quite early on in the development of a human infant, there can be said to
be, along with the purely somatic aspect of motility and bound together with it, a psychic
component; and with respect to the psychic as with respect to the somatic, we may reasonably
think that there is a stage (or a series of stages) in the development of motility that marks the
emergence of an individual.
In the present paper, I shall pursue the issue of motility in relation to the I through an
interpretation of the work of Donald Winnicott. To some, this may seem surprising, for while
there are many terms and ideas that have commonly come to be associated with Winnicott,
motility---and its relation to the self---is not usually among them. There is good reason for this.
Although Winnicott discussed motility, it was not a concept that he explicitly relied on in
organizing his thought, and it does not have the same pronounced presence as a trope in his work
as do other ideas---such as the facilitating environment, the good enough mother, the transitional
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object, creativity, play, and so on. Part of the suggestion of this paper, however, is that motility is
nonetheless a crucial idea connecting various strands within Winnicott’s work, and that some of
his most important ideas must be understood through the idea of motility if their significance is
to be fully appreciated.
So I shall explore here the issue of motility in relation to the self as an interpretation and
a reflection of a strand---what I shall claim is a central strand---within Winnicott’s thought.
Nonetheless, it is important, I think, to describe this paper in terms of a substantive question with
Winnicott as the primary source, rather than first and foremost as an interpretation of
“Winnicott’s view.” The difference, though one of emphasis, is significant. While the account
that I shall offer here---speculative in places---is (as I see it) drawn entirely from Winnicott, it is
the substantive question that concerns me; and because of this I shall not hesitate in pursuing that
question to cull ideas from throughout Winnicott’s work, to set them out and to organize them in
a way that is sometimes different from the way in which he himself did, and to extend those
ideas beyond his own explicit statement of them.
In the case of Winnicott, there is a special need for interpretation, and a special kind of
interpretation that is needed. For he was not himself a writer who took pleasure in working his
ideas into a systematic form or who took pains to do so. Though his writing is hardly the “chaos”
that he reportedly warned his students they would find in his lectures (Milner 1987, p. 246), it is
sufficiently allusive, pregnant, and even aphoristic at times that we can see what he meant by that.
This was partly a matter of personal style. Winnicott often seemed to be most comfortable
working out the details of his ideas in phrases and fragments. In his papers, we can experience a
mind on the move---pointing to this, teasing at that, basking in a provocative phrase,
experimenting with neologisms, sometimes seeming (or not just seeming) to contradict himself

4

within the same essay, all the while leaving the reader---one can say inviting or abandoning,
depending on one’s preference or mood---to put the ideas together, or to test whether, how, and
to what degree they fit together. But beyond, and in part behind, matters of style, there is the
matter of substance. Throughout Winnicott’s work, one can feel the exploratory drive of a
clinician and theorist pressing against the limits of what he knows and of what has yet been
conceptualized, striving to give expression to what he himself has not fully grasped and what
cannot yet easily be said---“stammer[ing] towards grasping the facts,” as Khan (1975) described
him (p. xi)---and refusing to be more definitive than was justified. As his ideas developed,
Winnicott rarely felt the need to revisit earlier ideas in the wake of new ones, instead focusing
now on this side of things and now on that, without worrying too much about how or whether
this and that could stand together. The result of this is a body of work that is richly layered, but
only partially integrated. I do not say this as a criticism (or commendation), only as a fact.
All of this is reflected in a striking characteristic of much of the secondary literature on
Winnicott. Perhaps more than is the case with any other psychoanalytic writer, there is in this
literature a heavy reliance on direct quotation, and often long quotations. This is sometimes
explained as necessary to capture his style; and this is understandably so, for his was indeed a
unique voice. But one may also sense in this a fear (justified, I think) that to try to restate
Winnicott in one’s own words is almost of necessity to take a position on it, to have to recast this
in order to make sense of that, to highlight not only the aporias and paradoxes to which
Winnicott himself meant to draw attention, but also the gaps and inconsistencies in his account
that did not much concern him. It is necessary, that is, to move from exposition down the road of
interpretation. Because of this, Winnicott is often, quite literally, given the last word.
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I am inclined to think that Winnicott got the last word (and the last laugh) in a different
respect as well. For him, the act of thinking was a creative process, and he himself expressed an
inability to read others except creatively (e.g., Khan 1975; Winnicott 1953, 1970b). And though
he may not have set out to do so (quite) intentionally, he left a body of work that is, as it were,
booby-trapped against attempts to describe it without at the same time continuing it. For me, then,
his work is best read as an open invitation to continue along a path not yet fully cleared and in
some cases only dimly perceived.
My intention here is to pick up that invitation, at least in a limited way---limited in that I
will remain largely within the terms that he set out. But at the same time, I shall press these ideas,
and in a direction and in a manner that may or may not correspond to what he might have said,
had he been willing to press them further and more concertedly himself. Despite this, I shall
venture to claim that the interpretation I shall offer is Winnicottian in several respects.
First---at least for me---everything I will say comes out of Winnicott’s writing. Second,
in pulling on strands of his thought from different points in his work and at times reformulating
them, I shall try to treat his work with just the kind of respect that he himself showed to it. And
third, Winnicott himself seemed to wish to be used---and as he well insisted, in using an object,
there is both a destructive and a creative aspect.
The interpretation I shall give is of his work, which is to say that it is my way of
understanding an aspect of his thought. It is implicit, I think, in this that I hope he would have
agreed with it. But I shall use him in the only way in which I can use him---that is, without
worrying too much at each step precisely how far he might have gone along.

BEING AND CONTINUITY
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Winnicott will not use the term motility in his writings until 1955. When he does come to
use it, it is in the context of a discussion of aggression. But before this, Winnicott had begun to
write about movement in the earliest states of the individual---late fetal and early neonatal life--from a different angle, in which the focus was on what he called continuity of being. This earlier
strand of thought was never abandoned; it is “earlier” only in the sense that the original
formulation was earlier, while the basic idea would be restated in a number of forms again and
again. Yet this strand of thought was never more than partially integrated with Winnicott’s
thinking about aggression. I shall read these two strands together and suggest that they are
usefully read as a progression of ideas---not in the sense that the work on aggression replaced the
earlier strand of thought, but that it added an important dimension to it.
So I shall begin with the general idea that Winnicott came to first. In doing so, I shall feel
free to take a number of interpretive liberties: restating ideas in my own way, interspersing
interpretation with quotations, combining various of Winnicott’s statements, and---where I quote
Winnicott at length---reordering passages so as to bring out certain ideas more clearly.
We cannot say just when motility begins. Like most early processes, it “does not arrive
at a certain time on a certain day” (Winnicott 1950--1955, p. 205), and yet there is a moment in
which we can say that it has definitely arrived, such as at that point in which we can describe
“babies [as] hav[ing] certain movements in the womb which at first are rather like the swimming
movements of a fish” (1988, p. 127). This early motility is, first and foremost, bodily: it is the
movement of a body through space, the movement that an observer can note and that a mother
will feel.
Yet there is early on a psychic component to this physical movement as well, a psychic
component that is immediately bodily: early on, the psyche is “not felt . . . to be localized”
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(1949b, p. 244), but is “at first fused” (1949a, p. 191) with soma---indeed, hardly “to be
distinguished [from it] except according to the direction from which one is looking” (1949b, p.
244), and only “gradually becoming distinguishable the one from the other” (1949a, p. 191). So
there is the physical movement that an observer can record, and there is also what is “both
physical and non-physical,” the experience of movement (1950--1955, p. 205). There is physical
movement through space, and there is the experience of movement through space and in time.
And when the environment is good and accommodating, the experience of movement through
space in time is continuous and is felt as such. If “things are going well” (1949a, p. 182), even
“before birth it can be said of the psyche (apart from the soma) that there is a personal goingalong, a continuity of experiencing” (1949a, p. 191), and there is a “personal development of the
infant ego . . . undisturbed in its emotional as in its physical aspect” (1949a, p. 182). This
“continuity of being is health” and is a “state of being [that] belongs to the infant and not to the
observer” (1988, p. 127).

If one takes the analogy of a bubble, one can say that if the pressure outside is adapted to
the pressure inside, then the bubble (1988, p. 127). . . that is to say, the infant’s self
(1949a, p. 188). . . has a continuity of existence, and if it were a human baby, this would
be called “being” (1988, p. 127). . . [This] experience of being . . . [is] the simplest of all
experiences. (1971a, p. 80)
In order to preserve the personal way of life at the very beginning, the individual needs a
minimum of environmental impingements producing reaction. (1949a, p.
182)…[However], this continuity, which could be called the beginnings of the self, is
periodically interrupted by phases of reaction to impingement (1949a, p. 191). . . . Here it
may be observed that the infant that is disturbed by being forced to react is disturbed out
of a state of “being,”. . . [for] when reacting, an infant is not “being.” (1949a, p. 185]
At its origin, being is continuity is the self, and what “interference with the personal
‘going along’” produces is a break in being, “a temporary loss of identity” (1949a, p. 184). Such
“interruption of . . . continuity by reactions to impingement” need not be traumatic for the infant,
8

so long as the interruptions “are not too severe or not too prolonged” (1988, pp. 128-9). And
through “the experience of a natural return from reacting to a state of not having to react,” (1949,
p. 183) the infant can begin “to organise a way of dealing with [impingements]” (1988, p. 129).
But where impingement becomes the dominant pattern, there is, by contrast, a “snapping of the
thread of continuity of the self” (1949a, p. 184) and a break-up of “that very thing which would
have formed itself into the ego of the differentiating human being” (1955--6, p. 296). Because
the early self is continuity of being, impingements that are extreme pose for the infant nothing
less than a “threat of annihilation” (1956, p. 303).
What, then, is the relationship between motility and this early state of continuity of being?
We need not say that they are merely one and the same. In addition to motility, there is also---for
instance, and notably---“the sensory side,” and Winnicott suggests that, for example, in utero, the
infant will have experienced temporary “interruptions of continuity” from “changes of pressure
and of temperature” (1988, p. 129). Yet these sensory experiences are themselves intimately
bound up with the experience of movement, and if motility is not the whole of the continuity of
being, it is central to it. Indeed, what distinguishes being from reaction most fundamentally is
what Winnicott refers to as personal impulse, and this immediately refers us back to the
significance of movement, and of a certain quality of movement. Let us call it free movement
(my term) or primitive motility (Winnicott’s term): movement that is uninhibited, nondefensive,
and that originates “in the centre” (1950-5, p. 211) or core of the individual. (See, e.g., 1950-5,
211-214; 1963a, pp. 184; 1959, pp. 49-52).
It is in relation to this kind of movement through space and in time that the language of
impingement is most meaningful. In relation to this kind of personal impulse, changes in
pressure or temperature may be experienced not only as a change, but as an interruption. And it
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is because of the centrality of motility to the early experience of continuity that, in his
speculative account of birth, Winnicott suggests that what distinguishes traumatic birth from
normal birth, which is not traumatic, is that in the former there is “the feeling of being in the
grips of something external, so that one is helpless.” (1949a, p. 184) In constrast,

. . . in the memory trace of a normal birth there [need be] no sense of helplessness. The
infant would feel that the swimming movements of which we know a foetus is
capable, . . . the movements that . . . [can be] referred to under the word reptation,
produce the forward movement. The actual birth can easily be felt by the infant, in the
normal case, to be a successful outcome of personal effort owing to the more or less
accurate timing. [1949a, p. 186]1

Over time, the experience of continuity will take on a more distinctly psychic character,
still tied to the body but less directly bound up with physical movement. But first and foremost,
early on and at the core of the healthy self, psyche and soma are bound together in free bodily
movement in time.
What is true for the fetus is true as well for the newborn: that “health . . . entails
continuity of being” and “early psyche-soma proceeds along a certain line of development
provided its continuity of being is not disturbed” (1949b, p. 245). In the period immediately after
birth, “the healthy development of the early psyche-soma” requires an environment that “actively
adapts to” protect “the newly formed psyche-soma” (1949b, p. 245) against impingements, and
that allows “for the infant to experience spontaneous movement” and thus to “become the owner
of the sensations that are appropriate to this early phase of life” (1956, p. 303). Where “the
environment impinges, . . . motility is . . . only experienced as a reaction to impingement” (1950-1955, pp. 211-212). And so a central task of the facilitating environment must be to prevent
1

"Reptation, n. The action of creeping or crawling. [1842] ... A mode of progression by
advancing successively parts of the trunk, which occupy the place of the anterior parts which are
carried forward, as in serpents" (Oxford English Dictionary, p. 672).
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impingements from overwhelming the infant’s own activity, to keep the environment from
pressing against the infant’s free movement through space and time, so that there is “a good basis
for the building up of a body-ego,” (1963b. p. 86) “a continuity of being which is the basis of
ego-strength” (1960b, p. 52).
The key ideas here---that the I begins in the experience of movement through space and
time (continuity), that the quality of the core self comes out of the quality of this movement (i.e.,
the extent to which it is free or defensive), and that environmental adaptation is crucially
important---will all remain central to Winnicott’s thinking about motility. But in the early 1950s,
he began to focus on an additional dimension of primary motility and its relation to the
environment: aggression.

MOTILITY AND AGGRESSION
One way of describing the shift in Winnicott’s thinking is this. In the earlier line of
thought, the emphasis was on the free movement of the infant in an environment and on the
inconspicuous adaptation of the healthy environment to the infant’s needs. And insofar as we are
concerned with the role of the “environment”---that is, the facilitating environment, or the good
enough mother or other caregiver---in protecting the infant against impingement, this is so. But
what is missing from this statement and mostly absent from the earlier account is attention to the
quality of the infant’s encounter with the environment.
Put more starkly, in the earlier statement, the inclination was to see opposition in relation
to the environment primarily in terms of opposition from the environment and the danger of
impingement. What Winnicott later came to emphasize, however, was that what mattered was
not whether there was opposition between the infant and the environment, but the direction of it.
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Opposition is indeed a characteristic of impingement---the environment forcing itself on the
infant and requiring it to react. But it does not follow from this that opposition in general is a
danger for the incipient self. Indeed, what Winnicott came to see was that, if some kind of
opposition was a threat to health, there was a different kind of experience of opposition that was
necessary for health, and that what distinguished these kinds of opposition was the relationship
of each to personal impulse and primitive motility. What he came to see, that is, is that, from the
beginning (or practically so), motility itself, at the core of the developing self, has a quality of
aggression.
This key insight represented not only a development in Winnicott’s thinking about
motility, but also a development in his thinking about aggression. In his early work on
aggression, he saw it as originating in the primitive love impulse: “originally a part of appetite,
or of some other form of instinctual love. It is something that increases during excitement and
the exercise of it is highly pleasurable” (c. 1939, pp. 87-88). Once again, the evolution in
Winnicott’s thought did not consist in his abandoning this earlier account of aggression: indeed,
in one of the very papers in which he offers a new account of the relation between motility and
aggression (and on which I shall focus presently), he repeats the idea that “aggression is part of
the primitive expression of love” (1950--1955, p. 205). We find this language appearing again in
subsequent work (e.g., 1963c, p. 79; 1968c, pp. 315-316).
But at the same time, Winnicott came to see that aggression had roots that were not
“instinctual” or drive-based---at least not in the way in which drives had been classically
understood. Whereas drives in the classical conception involve an endogenous stimulus or force
exerting pressure, one “that allows of . . . rising tension of general and local excitement, climax
and detumescence or its equivalent, followed by a period of lack of desire” (1950--1955, p. 215),
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the root of aggression in motility has the continuous character of activity. It aims not at the
release of tension, but at the experience of a certain kind of tension: the experience of opposition.
As Winnicott noted, while there is an “erotic experience [that] can be said to exist in the muscles
and other tissues involved in effort, . . . this erotism is of a different order from that of the
instinctual erotism associated with specific erotogenic zones” (ibid).
The relationship between motility and aggression, as Winnicott came to understand it, is
double-sided. On the one hand is the idea that the root (or at least a root) of aggression is
motility.2 But on the other is the idea that primitive motility itself has a quality of aggression.
Insofar as commentators have taken up Winnicott’s account of motility in relation to aggression,
it is the first of these that has been emphasized. But for the central issue that we are concerned
with here---the relationship of motility to the self---it is the second idea that deserves more of our
attention. This is the idea that free movement is not to be understood as movement that is
unencumbered, but as movement that is free (uninhibited) to discover the resistance of the world
and to press against it.
2

Winnicott will generally say the root. But it remains an important question how aggression that
is based in motility comes to be related to drives. I do not believe that Winnicott ever fully
resolved this question in his own mind. In “Aggression in Relation to Emotional Development,”
and in a number of later papers, he suggests that there is a “pre-fusion era,” and that part of
healthy development concerns “the task of fusion” in which the “infant must be able to pour as
much as possible of primitive motility into the id experiences.” (1950-55, p.214) This could be
taken to suggest that it is motility that lends to id impulses their active quality. But late in his life,
after writing “The Use of an Object,” Winnicott suggested “that the first drive is itself one thing,
something that I have called destruction, but I could have called it a combined love-strife drive.
This unity is primary.” (1969, p. 245) This can be taken to imply rather that there is no era of
“pre-fusion,” and that from the beginning, as Freud put it, “[e]very instinct is a piece of activity”
(1915, p. 122). (Freud wrote this before allowing the existence of a separate aggressive drive.
And once he did recognize this in the form of a death instinct, he, too, left open the question
whether “the two kinds of instinct…[ever] appear in isolation from each other.” [Freud, 1930, p.
119]) It is plausible to think that aggression, though it has an origin in motility, is not only an
outgrowth of motility. It is also plausible to think (these are not mutually exclusive) that motility
(which, as we are using that term, is already a fairly advanced development) and erotic impulses
share a common root. These are important questions well beyond the scope of this paper.
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Winnicott discusses the relationship between motility and aggression in a number of
places. However, to my mind, the key text is his “Aggression in Relation to Emotional
Development” (1950--1955)---a paper, I think, that has been unjustly neglected.3 Perhaps one
reason that it has not been given more attention is that it not an easy read. It bursts with ideas and
with the evident excitement of a writer who feels he is onto something quite significant. At the
same time, it is very much a work in progress. There is more than a little internal messiness, and
this, combined with the fact that it is actually three papers consolidated for publication---written
over a particularly generative five-year period in Winnicott’s development---gives the
impression of an account that is, let us say, richly stammering. With respect to a work such as
this, there are two alternative approaches: either one can leave it behind, or one can walk with it.
I shall try the latter. But in discussing this paper, I shall again be very much offering an
interpretation of it. I shall take parts of it, and I shall not hesitate to cut out parts of it that (to my
mind) gum up the account. (Some of these are directly contradicted by other passages in the
same consolidated paper; some are remnants of earlier formulations and ways of thinking.)
I noted earlier that those commentators who have paid any attention at all to Winnicott’s
account of the relation of motility and aggression have tended to focus on the motility roots of
aggression rather than (also) on the aggressive character of primitive motility. One reason for
this may have to do with Winnicott’s own shifting terminology. Particularly in the earliest of the
three papers that make up “Aggression in Relation to Emotional Development” (“Contribution to
Symposium,” written in 1950), Winnicott often uses the term aggression in a broad sense: to
refer to the whole history of the impulse from origin onward. For example:

3

A recent search of the Psychoanalytic Electronic Publishing database found that, of almost
9,000 papers citing Winnicott, only nine discussed his “Aggression in Relation to Emotional
Development,” and only five referred to it in relation to motility.
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Prior to integration of the personality there is aggression. [In a footnote inserted after
1955, he adds, “I would now link this idea with that of motility.”] A baby kicks in the
womb; it cannot be assumed that he is trying to kick his way out. A baby of a few weeks
thrashes away with his arms; it cannot be assumed that he means to hit. A baby chews the
nipple with his gums; it cannot be assumed that he is meaning to destroy or to hurt. At
origin, aggressiveness is almost synonymous with activity . . . . A complete study would
trace aggressiveness as it appears at the various stages of ego development: Early (Preintegration . . . ), Intermediate (Integration . . . ), Total Personal (Inter-personal
relationships . . . ). [1950--1955, pp. 204-206]

And yet, even in this early paper, Winnicott sometimes uses aggression in a more restricted
sense to refer to a later development: “It is these part-functions that are organized by the child
gradually, as he becomes a person, into aggression” (1950--1955, p. 205).
By the time he wrote the second of the three papers that formed “Aggression in Relation
to Emotional Development,” almost five years later, Winnicott was becoming more inclined to
speak of the original and general impulse in the language of motility, and to reserve the term
aggression for the more specific impulse that occurs with integration. The adoption of the term
motility to cover what was once described in the language of early aggression is indicated by the
later addition of the footnote in the passage that I quoted earlier. Similarly, in the second paper,
Winnicott writes:

Our task is to examine the pre-history of the aggressive element . . . . We have at hand
certain elements which date from at least as early as the onset of foetal movements--namely motility . . . . To get to something in terms of aggression corresponding to the
erotic potential it would be necessary to go back to the impulses of the foetus, to that
which makes for movement rather than for stillness, to the aliveness of tissues and to the
first evidence of muscular erotism . . . . We need a term here such as life force . . . .
[Subsequently, there is] the conversion of life force into aggression potential. [1950-1955, pp. 211, 216]

The shift in terminology is understandable: there is surely a form of aggression, more
determinate and in time more intentional, that comes only with integration, and it is sensible
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enough to use different terms to refer to the more basic impulse and to the later form of it. But
there are two potential dangers that come with the change in terminology.
The first is that reserving the term aggression for the later development may tempt one to
read Winnicott’s account as offering simply a theory of the origin of this thing we call
aggression. In contrast, the advantage of the earlier language was to draw attention to the quite
significant claim that was being offered: that what we tend to think of as aggression is a
particular development of a deeper and broader impulse, and that to understand aggression is to
continually insist that it be “link[ed]” with the basic “life force” (1950--5, pp. 204, 210) of
motility. That link is crucial, and it is a point on which Winnicott would insist for the rest of his
life: that to understand the nature of aggression, it is necessary to “dissect down” (1950--5, p.
210) below the ordinary understanding of it---beneath “reactive aggression,” beneath “hate”
(1950-5, p. 210) and beneath “jealousy, envy, anger at frustration, the operation of the instincts
that we name sadistic” (1970b, p. 287). Winnicott is offering an account of the roots of
aggression. But in doing so, he is also, and more fundamentally, offering a different account of
aggression.
A second potential danger, which brings us to the main point, is that distinguishing
between aggression and motility may incline us to lose sight of the kind of aggressivity that
Winnicott will insist is a fundamental characteristic of motility itself: namely, the pleasure in,
and the eventual seeking of, opposition. In healthy development, “opposition” in this very early
stage is not opposition or encroachment from the environment (impingement), but rather the
opposition that is the existence of an environment itself---that which is met up against, that which
we as observers would call (and what the infant will come in time to experience as) an outside
and that, because it resists, can be pushed against.
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Perhaps the first experience of this, in utero, is accidental: “The foetal impulses bring
about a discovery of environment, this latter being the opposition that is met through movement,
and sensed during movement” (1950--1955, p. 216). But very early on, this experience of
opposition becomes part of the experience of motility and of its pleasure. As Winnicott puts it in
a later paper:

If we look and try to see the start of aggression in an individual, what we meet is the fact
of infantile movement. This starts even before birth, not only in the twistings of the
unborn baby, but also in the more sudden movement of limbs that make the mother say
she is feeling a quickening . . . . A part of the infant moves and by moving meets
something . . . . In every infant there is this tendency to move and to get some kind of
muscle pleasure in movement, and to gain from the experience of moving and meeting
something. [1964c, pp. 233-234]
Indeed, the motility impulse cannot “give any satisfactory experience unless there is opposition.
The opposition must come from the environment, from the Not-Me which gradually comes to be
distinguished from the Me” (1950--1955, p. 215, italics added).
Because of the aggressive quality of early motility, Winnicott will occasionally---even in
the latter two of the consolidated papers---use the term aggression to refer to the very early
impulse, as well as to its subsequent development. This can produce some confounding passage,
such as this one:

It is true that to some extent aggressive impulses can find their opposition without
external opposition; this is displayed normally in the fish movements of the spinal
column that date from prenatal life . . . . In spite of those considerations can one not say
that in normal development opposition from outside brings along the development of the
aggressive impulse? . . . Opposition affects the conversion of life force [that is, the
original motility impulse] into aggression potential. [1950--1955, pp. 215-216]
So aggression here is used first to refer to early movement that must “find [the] opposition” it
needs, and then also to that impulse (or form of impulse) that comes later, and that is produced in
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part through opposition. We could dismiss this as terminological confusion. But it is better seen,
I think, as a reflection of the phenomenon itself: that although one may wish to reserve the term
aggression for the more particular impulse that develops through the experience of opposition,
there is also a kind of aggression that characterizes the root motility impulse itself: that which
finds satisfaction in encountering resistance and pressing against it. “It is this impulsiveness,” as
Winnicott puts it, “and the aggression that develops out of it, that makes the infant need an
external object, and not merely a satisfying object,” that “needs to find opposition . . . something
to push against” (1950--1955, pp. 217, 212, italics in original).
From the beginning, then, or very nearly so, motility is bound up with aggression. First,
this is so in that---in an idea that has by now become rather common, concerning the root of
aggression---“[a]t origin, aggressiveness is almost synonymous with activity” (1950-5, p. 204).
But it is also so in a second sense, one which I am wishing to highlight here, one that is less
familiar and perhaps more extraordinary in its implications: that not only is aggression at origin
activity, but that activity is, almost from its origin, aggressive, that the basic motility impulse
needs (or very early on, comes to need) a world to press against; that at a fundamental level,
there is a need for, and pleasure in, opposition, and that this need for and pleasure in opposition
is not born of hatred and hostility, but is prior to them.

MOTILITY, AGGRESSION, SELF
How is this early motility/primitive aggression related to the emerging self? I have noted
one connection already: that with integration of the self, early forms of motility are consolidated
into “aggression” in the more usual and determinate sense of the term. But the relation among
these goes in the other direction as well. As Winnicott saw, it is the experience of meeting and
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pressing against the environment (primitive aggression) that itself helps to establish the
distinction between a Me and a Not-Me that is central to integration of the I. So, if on the one
hand it can be said that “prior to integration of the personality” (1950-5, p. 204), there is
motility-aggression---and that this comes to be “organized by the child gradually, as he becomes
a person” from part-functions into more integrated patterns of aggression (1950-5, p. 205)---on
the other hand and more foundationally, it is motility/primitive aggression that helps to organize
part-functions into a person. It is through the experience of moving against, of finding opposition
and pressing on it, that there arises a feeling of unity in the relation to an (incipient) outside, and
“an early recognition” of the “distinction between what is the self and what is not the self”
(1964c, p. 234). It is not only, then, that the motility impulse cannot “give any satisfactory
experience unless there is opposition . . . from the environment . . . which gradually comes to be
distinguished from the Me” (1950-5, p. 215), but also that, as Winnicott adds just further on, it is
precisely as the result of this opposition that there develops “an early recognition of a Not-Me
world, and an early establishment of the Me” (1950-5, p. 216). Of course, any such experience of
a self can only be very incipient and very transient. (“In practice these things develop gradually,
and repeatedly come and go, and are achieved and lost” [1950--1955, p. 216].) But the important
point is not the precise timetable. It is Winnicott’s recognition of a fundamental link between the
experience of pressing against a world and the development of a self.
What is at stake, however, is not only the development of a self, but the kind of self that
develops---not just motility, but the character of motility and the experience of opposition. “The
question,” as Winnicott puts it, “is how will contact [with the environment] be made? Will it be
part of the life-process of the individual, or will it be as a part of the restlessness of the
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environment?” (1988, p. 127, italics added). What are “the patterns that evolve round this matter
of motility”? (1950--1955, p. 211).
There are, of course, many patterns and variations, but in the “pattern . . . we call healthy,”
“the environment is constantly discovered and rediscovered because of motility” (1950-5, pp.
211-2). So we are brought back again to the idea of free movement---but now as the movement
of an emerging Me. At first, there is “perhaps . . . [a] movement of spine or leg in the womb”
(1988, p. 128); after birth, perhaps a movement of the head that finds a breast, or the flailing of
an arm that comes up against the skin of the one holding it, eventually a more definite reach and
push against a mouth or an eye, a touch, a pressing of legs into the stomach or chest or legs of
another, a pushing up against, a feeling of (as it comes gradually to be felt) an outside, a Not-Me,
a resistance that can hold the pressure against it. There is pleasure in this meeting an outside, in
pressing against an otherness that, through a combination of yielding and resisting, can receive it.
Here, because it is the infant’s “own movements . . . [that] discover the environment” (1988, p.
128), “each experience” of this kind “emphasizes . . . that it is in the centre that the new
individual is developing” (1950-5, p. 211). “This, repeated, becomes a pattern of relationship”
(1988, p. 128) for an “individual [who] can enjoy going around” discovering and rediscovering a
Not-Me world and “looking for appropriate opposition” (1950-5, p. 212).
All this requires, of course, what Winnicott calls a proper holding environment, one

. . . with love expressed (as at first it can only be expressed) in physical terms. The
mother holds the baby (in womb, or in arms) and through love (identification) knows
how to adapt to ego needs. Under these conditions, and under these alone, the individual
may start to exist. [1950--1955, p. 212]

To be held is, in part, to feel the pressure of the environment; and the holding environment and
the capacity of the individual to emerge (in health) is defined (in part) by the quality of physical
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pressure, the quality of “contact . . . [and] movement” (1948, p. 161) between mother (or other
caretaker) and baby. For the baby to make contact with the environment depends on its being
already in contact with it; the possibility of its pressing against depends on its being pressed
against (in the right way); the possibility of discovering the environment depends on being
contained. “The emerging self requires a combination of resistance and reception, a Not-Me
strong enough to withstand the baby’s pressure and pliant enough to receive the spontaneous
gesture” (1963c, p. 73). And in addition to all that is entailed by physical holding, the word
holding carries the sense (etymologically, its original sense) of guarding, preserving, or
defending---in this context, holding back or “ward[ing] off” (1960b, p. 46) those “movement[s]
from the environment” (1988, p. 127) that interfere with the capacity of “the infant [to] dominate”
(1948, p. 161), to discover on its own and “at the baby’s rate” (1947, p. 201) the “external shared
world” (1948, p. 161). For it is only when impingements are sufficiently managed that “the
infant starts living a personal and individual life” (19, 0b. 31).
In the “less fortunate case,” the primary experience of opposition is of aggression from
the other direction, and rather than the experience of meeting up against a world, moving and
pressing against an outside, “the pattern of relationship is based on a movement from the
environment” (1988, p. 128) in on the infant. In this case, “instead of a series of individual
experiences,” “[m]otility is then only experienced as a reaction to impingement” (1950-5, pp.
211-12).

In ill-health at this very early stage it is the environment that impinges, and the life force
is taken up in reactions to impingement---the result being the opposite to the early firm
establishment of the Me. In the extreme there is very little experience of impulses except
as reactions, and the Me is not established. Instead we find a development based on the
experience of reaction to impingement, and there comes into existence an individual that
we call false because the personal impulsiveness is missing. [1950-5, pp. 215-16]

21

Where this pattern dominates, the individual must remain in a state of dependence on
environmental action: “To a lesser or a greater degree, the individual must be opposed . . . .
Environmental impingement must continue,” for “only if opposed does the individual tap the
important motility source.” Indeed, “since the individual cannot develop a personal pattern,”
“environmental impingement must continue . . . [and] have a pattern of its own else chaos reigns”
(1950-5, p. 212).
What is at stake here in the quality of motility is nothing less, then, than the constitution
of the self. In the character of motility, in the particular pattern of movement in relation to an
environment, the I develops. How will this occur? Will the encounter be on the infant’s own
terms? Will the environment allow itself to be discovered and probed and pushed up against by
the infant in her own way, out of her own impulses? Can it receive the infant’s movements, its
gestures and forays? Can it hold itself and the infant as the infant presses against it, flailing,
stretching, reaching, attacking? Or will the environment insist on being the dominant force,
making demands on the infant, disrupting the infant’s own movement and forcing it into reaction?
Will the aggression come from the infant or will it come from the environment? So central is the
importance of the infant’s own “impulses [in] bring[ing] about a discovery of environment,” so
significant is the feeling of “position that is met through movement,” so crucial is the growth of
aggression that has its “root in personal impulse, motivated in ego spontaneity” (1950-5, pp. 21617), that Winnicott will characterize the true self just in terms of this kind of movement. Only
through this kind of movement, as Winnicott will sometimes put it, does the individual, in the
full sense of the term, start to exist at all. By contrast, “[w]here impingement is too
overwhelming, the result is a failure . . . to evolve an individual” (1950--1955, p. 212).
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Whether we use that language, or whether we use the term individual more inclusively
(as Winnicott sometimes does as well), while distinguishing between health and ill health, the
basic idea is the same: that through (in part) aggressive motility (in the sense that I have
described), the self is born and takes shape.

PSYCHIC MOTILITY AND OBJECTS
I have been focusing thus far on the experience of early physical movement, an
experience that is both physical and psychic---two sides of the same coin, hardly to “be
distinguished except according to the direction from which one is looking.” But, “gradually, the
psyche and the soma aspects of the growing person” “become distinguishable” (1949b, p. 244).
What then becomes of the primitive motility impulse on the psychic side? Must it be understood
as still restricted to the experience of physical movement? Or can we not also speak of a kind of
psychic motility that goes beyond the experience and imaginative elaboration of physical
movement?
One way of approaching these questions is by inquiring into the negative or interruption
of free movement---or, in Winnicott’s language, impingement. Impingement includes, perhaps
most basically, restrictions on free physical movement, and we have discussed it thus far in those
terms. Even with respect to in utero sensory impingements, I earlier suggested that, to the extent
that “changes of pressure and temperature” (1988, p. 129) are experienced as interruptions, it is
likely because of their connection to personal impulse, and that this in turn is originally bound up
with the experience of physical movement.
But Winnicott also talks about such sensory impingements on neonatal activity as the
sound of “low-flying aircraft” (1948, p. 161) or “the door banging as the baby goes to the breast”
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(1970a, p. 86), and this suggests something else. What is the nature of these impingements? Or,
to put it from the other direction, what is the nature of the personal impulse or movement that is
being impinged? In response to these noises, the mother may not turn away at all, and the breast
may be no less physically available; yet there is (or may be) still an interruption. So if the baby’s
physical movement of going to the breast is indeed interrupted, this must be as a consequence of
(or part and parcel of) a different kind of interruption. Or, to say the same thing from the other
side again, it is an interruption to a different kind of movement. That this is so is suggested by
Winnicott’s apt phrase going to the breast. What is entailed in this going to? There is an
inclination toward, an impulse from here to that. This impulse, though bound up with the body,
is distinguishable from physical movement and may or may not actually be completed in
physical movement. It is in reference to this kind of movement that a term such as psychic
motility seems appropriate (though Winnicott himself does not use it).
Now, the aircraft and door-banging are what we (the observer) will take to be external
impingements. However, for the infant who has not yet “separated off what is not-ME from what
is ME” (1968b, p. 90), impingements on psychic motility are not limited to “external” (as we
know them to be) events. There is also, as Winnicott writes, the sudden arrival of “instinct
tension,” and this---particularly when there has been scant memory of the experience---can be
felt no less, and often much more, as a shock and an impingement: like “a clap of thunder or a
hit.” “Instinctual demands can be fierce and frightening and at first can seem to the infant like
threats to existence. Being hungry is like being possessed by wolves” (1964d, pp. 80-81).
Another task of the holding environment, then, is to “hold the situation in time” (1988, p. 155),
so that the infant can learn to assimilate instinctual events into the personal movement that is at
the core of the healthy self. From an “ego [that] is not yet able to include” “id-excitements” and

24

for which such excitements “can be traumatic,” there can thus develop “a personal ego . . . [that
can] ride instincts” and “integrat[e] . . . quiet and excited types of relationships” (1988, p. 69).
And in this way, “a rapidly increasing amount of” what once experienced as impingement
“becomes expected and allowed for” without “disturbing [the] continuity of psyche-soma”
(1949b, p. 247). Here, then, we have, once again, a kind of motility that is bound up with the
body, but that is not as directly fused with physical movement. Instead, it is to be understood in
terms of the baby’s own continuous sense of movement through time.
I have come at the idea of what I am calling psychic motility from the perspective of
impingements because, as with the associated concepts of the true self and false self (1960a, p.
148), it is perhaps most easily understood in relation to its disruptions. But we can come to
psychic motility (and the true self) from the positive side as well. Psychic motility is, for instance,
at the heart of what Winnicott calls the creative gesture, such as the “gesture of a baby who
reaches out for the mother’s mouth and feels her teeth, and at the same time looks into her eyes,
seeing her creatively” (1971b, p. 106). It is through this creative gesture, as Winnicott describes
it, that the infant imaginatively produces early objects.4 In the passage that I quoted of the baby
“go[ing] to the breast” (1970a, p. 86), the point of view is of the observer: the view of the breast
as already in the world and external to the baby. Elsewhere, however, Winnicott will offer an
account from the perspective, as he imagines it, of the very young infant, and from that point of
4

For reasons of space, I shall leave for elsewhere a discussion of the relationship of psychic
motility and the true self. I shall also leave aside the question of the connection, which I think is
quite significant, between psychic motility and the baby’s need to “look round” and see “the
mother’s face” looking back, and in that special way to get “something of themselves back from
the environment” (1967, p. 112). Is not looking around and being seen back a form of healthy
“opposition” (involving, as I have said, a combination of yielding and resisting) toward, and of,
the environment? We well know from the more recent literature on early mother--child
interaction how much depends on the quality of what Beebe and Lachmann (1988) call kinesic
interaction---that is, “movement [that includes] specifically . . . changes of orientation, gaze, and
facial expression” (p. 318).
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view, going toward has a far more creative character.
“Let us imagine,” he writes, “a theoretical first feed,” meant to capture what is
“represented in real life by the summation of the early experiences of many feeds” (1988, p. 106).

Imagine a baby who has never had a feed. Hunger turns up, and the baby is ready to
conceive of something; out of need the baby is ready to create a source of satisfaction
[1964a, p. 90] . . . . I would say that the infant is ready to believe in something that could
exist; i.e., there has developed in the infant a readiness to hallucinate an object; but that is
rather a direction of expectancy than an object in itself [1948, p. 163] . . . . If at this
moment the mother places her breast where the baby is ready to expect something, and if
plenty of time is allowed for the infant to feel round, with mouth and hands, and perhaps
with a sense of smell [1964a, p. 90] . . . the baby begins to have material with which to
create [1988, p. 106] . . . . At the start the mother allows the infant to dominate [1948, p.
163] [and if all goes well] [g]radually it can be said that the baby is ready to hallucinate
the nipple at the time when the mother is ready with it [1988,p. 106] . . . . The baby
eventually gets the illusion that this real breast is exactly the thing that was created out of
need, greed, and the first impulses of primitive loving . . . .A thousand times before
weaning [this will be repeated] . . . . A thousand times . . . the feeling has existed that
what was wanted was created, and was found to be there [1964a, p. 90].5

Winnicott does not describe this explicitly in the language of motility. But what is
happening here? The impulsive gesture, at first almost wholly taking the form of physical
movement, now involves a more distinctly psychic reaching out, “a gesture that [arises] out of
need, the result of an idea that [rides] in on the crest of a wave of instinctual tension” (1988, p.
110), a gesture that involves a creation of “nipple and . . . milk,” and everything else that is
entailed by what we shall call “breast for simplification of description” (1948, p. 163). So there
is the physical reach---for the actual breast that, we know, has been presented---but there is also,
from the perspective of the baby, a creative movement, a psychic reach: from the here of
immediacy of need to the there of an otherness that can satisfy it.6 The primitive spontaneity of
5

I have taken the liberty of combining several different statements that Winnicott offers of this
early object relating.
6
There is no need here, Winnicott cautions, to postulate an originary preconception of a physical
breast. The actual breast may in reality first be found by the infant, who imagines having created
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the physical gesture is now elaborated as a creative psychic gesture, one that is capable of
finding a breast out of need.
I earlier emphasized Winnicott’s key insight concerning the particular aggressive
character of primitive motility: the pleasure of discovering an environment and pressing against
it. At the “early stage,” writes Winnicott, “when the Me and the Not-Me are being established, it
is the aggressive component that more surely drives the individual to a need for a Not-Me or an
object that is felt to be external,” “an external object and not merely a satisfying object” (1950-1955, p. 215). Is it not precisely this aggressive component that we can understand to be at the
core of the creative gesture? For what is imaginatively produced in the creative reach but an
incipient otherness---not merely relief of instinctual tension, but an object that can be found in
being made, that can receive the infant’s pressure and its pressing need? What is produced in the
creative reach is the beginning of a world. This psychic motility is a direct descendant of
physical motility, still unmistakably bound to it but nonetheless distinguishable from it. Where
the aggressiveness of physical motility finds pleasure in a world that resists and that can be
pressed against---the experience of physical body pushing against physical body---the
aggressiveness of this psychic motility takes the form of an imaginative reaching or pressing out
that produces a world that can be pressed against. Thus “starts off the infant’s ability to use
illusion, without which no contact is possible between the psyche and the environment,” and
through which the “environment is discovered without loss of sense of self” (1952b, pp. 222223).
Eventually, “through the living experience of a relationship between the mother and the
baby,” “the capacity for illusion” will permit “gradual disillusioning” (1948, p. 163). But it is
it. But having “found” it, there is, then, in subsequent feeds the “material with which to create” it
(1988, p. 106).
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from this early experience of imaginative extension, of pressing toward a world that can meet the
pressure, of producing a world that can be found, that there “develops a belief that the world can
contain what is wanted and needed” (1964a, p. 90), and that “lay[s] down the foundation” for
“reach[ing] to the world creatively, . . . enjoy[ing] and us[ing] what the world has to offer”
(1968a, p. 25). From this, there develops the “ability to create the world” (1970c, p. 40), even if
in a different way we also know that we can “only create what we find” (1970c, p. 53).
I have used the term psychic motility here, and it may well be asked: is such talk just a
metaphor? The answer depends on what we mean by this, and the simplest answer is yes and no:
if we should call it a metaphor, we should not call it just a metaphor. At its origin, motility is
directly concerned with physical movement---just as, at first, incorporation is directly concerned
with the “ingestion of food” and bound up with oral libidinal pleasures (Freud 1905, p. 198). For
both, there is always a psychic aspect, but they are at first so connected to the immediate bodily
processes that they elaborate that we can properly say they are first and foremost bodily: bodily
movement and bodily incorporation. Over time, however, incorporation will become the model
or prototype (in Strachey’s translation of Vorbild) “of a process which, in the form of
identification” and psychic incorporation of objects “is later to play such an important
psychological part” (Freud 1905, p. 198)---such as, for example, in Freud’s (1925) account of
judgment:

Expressed in the language of the oldest---the oral---instinctual impulses, the judgement is:
“‘I should like to eat this,’ or ‘I should like to spit it out’; and, put more generally: ‘I
should like to take this into myself and to keep that out.’ That is to say: ‘It shall be inside
me’ or ‘it shall be outside me.’” [p. 237]

Similarly, we can say that physical movement through space and in time becomes the
model or prototype for psychic motility, including the experience of psychic continuity. Eating,
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chewing, sucking, devouring, and such; forward movement, “going-along,” reptation, pressure,
impingements, and such---these are all, it could be said, metaphors of psychic life. But if they are
metaphors, they do not merely describe psychic life; they organize it. In this sense, they are
metaphors that thinking makes actual.7

CONCLUSION
The idea that the self is formed in relation to an other or to a world---the Me as distinct
from a Not-Me---has long been a truism, too trite to bear repetition. Psychoanalysis did not
discover this idea. But central to psychoanalysis’s contribution to our understanding of human
beings has been its exploration of the dynamics of this process, its pursuit of questions such as:
how does the self emerge in relation to an environment; what comes to be felt as a part of the self
and why; how is the self (or aspects of the self), as it comes to be organized at a particular
moment, related to what is taken to be “the world” (or aspects of the world); and what
determines the character of this relationship?
When we use the term ego to refer to a kind of “agency,” what we are referring to in part
is the self from the perspective of the active and continuing processes of organizing or
constituting itself in relation to the world.8 One important aspect of this is that which is captured
in the language of introjection, identification, incorporation, projection, and such: the complex
processes by which the contours and boundaries of the self are articulated and fantasized. I
7

That metaphors can be made literal by the way they organize our understanding is not limited
to these kinds of intrapsychic metaphors. “[O]nce upon a time,” the late philosopher Donald
Davidson observed, “rivers and bottles did not, as they do now, literally have mouths.” (1978, p.
37).
8
I have placed the familiar word “agency” in scare quotes here because there is a danger of
thinking of the ego as a kind of active subject that produces an object-self. We must always
remember that the self is produced, reproduced, and reconstituted in part through these processes,
not as a passive consequence of them.
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referred to these earlier as involving the idea of the self as a kind of container, and this important
way of understanding the self is not only from the perspective of an outside observer, but is a
self-conception.
A general aim of this paper---its substantive aim---has been to suggest that, in addition to
these processes, there is another set of dynamics that is central to the development and
organization of the self; it is these that I have discussed under the general heading of motility.
(How these two sets of dynamics interact is a large and important question that deserves further
inquiry.) While for the idea of the self as container, it is characteristic to think of the ego as a
secondary process, concerned with organizing both primary impulses and objects, in the case of
motility, the self and ego begin directly in impulse. Motility, that is, is not to be conceived in the
first instance as an impulse of the self to be managed, but as at the core of the primitive self. The
central or true self, in Winnicott’s words, begins as “the inherited potential which is experiencing
a continuity of being” (1960c, p. 46), and from “the summation of motility experiences . . . the
individual . . . [can] start to exist” (1950--1955, pp. 213-214).
The second general aim of this paper---the interpretive aim---has been to suggest the
significance of motility within Winnicott’s thought. In examining the place of motility in the
emerging self, I have focused on several key ideas of his work. Most broad is the idea of what I
have referred to as free movement. This includes, naturally, movement in space that is
uninhibited and unencumbered by environmental impingement. But it also includes two
characteristics that are less intuitive and therefore in need of emphasis. The first of these is the
experience of movement through time. Although here I have touched only briefly on this, I have
wanted to suggest, following Winnicott, that our understanding of ego development and the
organization of the self is lacking unless we give an adequate place to the question of time. How
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does an individual experience time---how does she live in time? It is one implication of the
discussion here that for an infant whose pattern of motility is dominated by the need to react to
impingement, time will likely be experienced much more as a series of discrete moments than as
a continuity. These important matters deserve more attention.
The second, less obvious aspect of free movement that I have meant to emphasize, and to
which I have given here the greater share of attention, is the centrality of a primary form of
aggression. This aggression refers to the pressure exerted against an otherness, and the pleasure
of meeting (which includes creating) a world that can receive this pressure and hold it, without
being destroyed and without retaliation: an environment that offers resistance without
impingement. Again, there is more to be said about this, which must be left for a different
occasion.9 The general point, however, is this: that we cannot adequately understand ego
development or the constitution of an individual without attending to the significance of patterns
of aggressive-motility experience, and that what distinguishes healthy motility from an unhealthy
pattern is not the existence of resistance, but the relation to it.
How will the self come to be organized? To what extent will it be along the lines of
“personal impulse, motivated in ego spontaneity,” 217) “impulse-doing” (1970c, p. 39), with an
emphasis on the pleasures of probing, pressing, discovering, and creating a world in and out of
fantasy? To what extent will it be organized, instead, “on the pattern of reacting to stimuli”
(ibid.), “dependent on the experience of opposition” (1950--5, p. 217) from without, or even
“persecution” (217): “reactive-doing” (1970c, p. 39)?
What will be the response to the experience of “objects that get in the way” (1970c, p.
42)? Will there be a disposition to “reach[] out in some way so that if an object is in the way
there can be a relationship” (1970c, p. 41), and will this encounter “feel like a part of life and real”
9

In particular, I shall take up elsewhere the relationship of the motility impulse to destruction.
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(1988, p. 128) and bring about a feeling of being alive? Will the individual “experienc[e]
reaching out and finding an object as a creative act” (1970c, p. 42)? Or will the individual
experience the world as demanding compliance, and the resistance of objects that “get in the way”
as “detract[ing] from the sense of real living, which is only regained by return to isolation in
quiet” (1988, p. 128)? Will the need be felt to “develop a technique of withdrawal,” lest the
individual be “stifle[d] . . . and . . . cease to be” (1970c, p. 52)?
Will life be led on the maxim: “Reach out and it shall be there for you to have, to use, to
waste,” to create? Or on the basis of a feeling that nothing means anything: “I couldn’t care less”?
(1970c, p. 50) Can the individual live creatively, feeling pleasure in creating a world while in
relationship with “all that exists already” (1970a, p. 53) and engaging “collectively . . . with
others” (1970c, p. 50)? Or will the individual, “in the guise of being creative and having a
personal view of everything,” retain the need for constant “omnipotence . . . and control” (1970c,
p. 50)? “When seeking a reassurance that life is worth living,” will a “person go out for
experience or withdraw from the world” (1988, p. 128)? Will the individual, even with the
arrival of “an intellectual understanding of the fact of the world’s existence prior to the
individual’s,” still be capable of “feeling . . . that the world is personally created” (1988, p. 111)?
Will otherness be experienced as a threat to the self or as enlivening? Will aggression be
experienced as destructive only, or as destructive-creative?
For Winnicott, early motility experiences are pivotal in constituting core patterns of the
self and, by virtue of this, basic dispositions toward the world.10 In the common state of affairs,
these patterns will be sufficiently complex and multiform that they can, alongside and in relation
to other ego processes, continue to develop over a lifetime. Yet here as elsewhere, it is those
10

There is an apt analogy here with the view that early affective experience is pivotal in shaping
id impulses. Here Kernberg’s work has been central; for a summary of this, see Kernberg (2001).
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“basic patterns . . . laid down . . . near the beginning . . . [that will] have the greatest influence”
(1970c, p. 39). These are ideas vital to Winnicott’s thought, and in no area are his contributions
more vital to ours.
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